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DEFINING THE ‘SICK SOCIETY’: DISCOURSES OF CLASS AND MORALITY IN 
BRITISH, RIGHT WING NEWSPAPERS DURING THE 2011 ENGLAND RIOTS 
 
ABSTRACT  
Between 6
th
 and 10
th
 August 2011, acts of violence and civil disobedience occurred in sixty-
six locations across London and other cities in England. Initial responses from politicians and 
the press sought to explain why the riots were happening and what responses were necessary. 
This paper shows how the initial depoliticised actions of rioters were redefined as a 
politicised problem, symbolic of a sick society that could be cured by Conservative social 
policy. I provide a Critical Discourse Analysis of 30 articles (between 9
th
 and 12
th
 August) 
from British, right wing newspapers (Daily Mail; Sun; Daily Telegraph); exploring 
discursive constructions of social class, morality, the ‘mob’, and perceptions of a ‘sick 
society’ that mobilised a battlefield of political arguments during and after the riots.  
As previous work has demonstrated, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can explore political 
complexities, paradoxical persuasions and discursive complications whilst remaining critical 
in its approach (Kelsey, 2012, 2013). I argue that the right wing press featured nuanced 
discursive and paradoxical mechanisms, whilst maintaining a broader, consistent, ideological 
position. This paper shows how ideological consistencies that operate beyond the foreground 
and immediacy of individual texts can override the appearance of discursive contradiction 
across longitudinal contexts. Hence, the discursive landscape that I cover in this article can be 
interpreted through an understanding of paradoxical persuasion amongst other discursive and 
political contexts.    
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On 4
th
 August 2011 a 29 year old black male was shot dead by police in Tottenham. On 6
th
 
August a peaceful protest took place in Tottenham against the shooting. When police in 
Tottenham attempted to disperse the protest violent clashes occurred as large groups also 
responded by setting fire to police and public properties. From 7
th
 August onwards, these acts 
of violence and civil disobedience spread across London and other cities in England with 
riots and looting taking place in sixty-six locations. Whilst these were not necessarily 
instances of protest violence following the events in Tottenham, they were clearly reactions 
mobilised by the riots that started a day earlier. Lasting until 10
th
 August, 5 people died in the 
riots, which are estimated to have involved up to 15,000 people and cost the country up to 
half a billion pounds (Bridges, 2012:2).  
This article explores press responses during the riots followed by coverage of those arrested 
when the accused appeared in court. The latter then leads to coverage of proposed, legislative 
measures for punishing perpetrators. As I show, contentions between constructions of social 
class, morality, who the ‘mob’ consisted of (demographically), and what politicians mean 
when they refer to a ‘sick society’ mobilised a battlefield of ideological constructions. As 
previous work has demonstrated Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can explore ideological 
complexities, paradoxical persuasions and discursive complications whilst remaining critical 
it its approach (Kelsey, 2012, 2013). By considering such discursive nuances I address the 
following questions: How did right wing newspapers suppress critical discourses of 
deprivation and austerity during the riots? How were the depoliticised actions of rioters 
redefined as a political problem (a sick society) to justify legislative responses from the 
government? 
This article does not attempt to propose one, fixed answer to explain why the riots happened 
or who was to blame. Actually, as Cavalcanti et al. (2012: 35)  argue, fundamental problems 
faced in attempts to understand why these riots happened lie in reductionist discourses that 
constructed them as a product of one particular social, economic or political issue from either 
end of the political spectrum. So this paper recognises that whilst there was not one fixed 
explanation for the riots, these different responses discursively constructed the riots in 
political contexts. Even in instances when rioters supposedly lacked a political message or 
motivation, these events were still understood through mediatized and political contexts by 
journalists, politicians and the public. By addressing the research questions I have posed it is 
possible to assess how various media and political sources constructed social and political 
actors during the riots and how particular, political messages were both suppressed and 
mobilised through media discourses. Various authors have commented on responses to the 
riots, some of which should be considered before my own analysis.  
 
RIOTS UNDER REVIEW 
Initial responses to the riots sought to explain why they were happening. Whilst issues of race 
were represented as partly relevant to begin with, widespread looting and rioting across the 
country had clearly taken on a less identifiable or common cause for violence than those on 
the initial evening following the protest against the police. Bridges has examined some of the 
responses from politicians following the initial unrest in Tottenham: 
… [David] Lammy was one of the first politicians, standing before cameras on 
Tottenham High Road the following day, to describe the rioters as ‘mindless, 
mindless people’, to which he has subsequently added the epitaphs of nihilistic and 
hedonistic. In this, Lammy gave the lead to other political leaders in their 
characterisation of the riots as ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Prime Minister David 
Cameron), ‘needless and opportunist theft and violence’ (Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg) and the product of ‘a feral underclass’ (Justice Secretary Kenneth Clark) 
(Bridges, 2012:3). 
These responses demonstrated a tendency among political sources to depoliticise, criminalise 
and deligitmise voices that sought to provide deeper, sociological and economic analysis of 
the riots. In response, Younge argues that the context of the riots held a political substance, 
even if the immediate actions did not appear to be explicitly political:   
Insisting on the criminality of those involved, as though that alone explains their 
motivation and the context is irrelevant, is fatuous. To stress criminality does not deny 
the political nature of what took place, it simply chooses to only partially describe it. 
They were looting, not shop-lifting, and challenging the police for control of the 
streets, not stealing coppers’ hubcaps. When a group of people join forces to flout 
both law and social convention, they are acting politically. (The question, as yet 
unanswered, is to what purpose.) (Younge, Guardian, 2011)  
As psychologists Steve Reicher and Cliff Stott – who I return to in my analysis – have 
commented, the language of ‘mindlessness’ and simplistic descriptions of the ‘mob’ are 
dangerous, misleading and unhelpful since they detract from the deeper understandings that 
are needed in explaining why these events occur (2011). It is also worth noting that the Riots 
Communities and Victims Panel, set up by the coalition government with a cross-party make-
up, was reluctant to acknowledge structural factors in society or courses of poverty, 
deprivation and family issues that it implied were contributing factors in a ‘culture of 
poverty’ (Bridges, 2012:8).1 As Bridges also observed, ‘Even when the Panel touches on 
more structural issues, it does so in ways that seem oblivious to the depth of the economic 
crisis and government austerity cuts, especially as they impact on the inner cities’ (ibid:9). 
It is the tension between condemnatory and observational or empathetic analyses of the riots 
that contextualise the focus of this paper. Whilst the former were concerned with inexcusable 
criminality that left little space for alternative analysis, the latter sought to provide further 
attention to detail regarding political and socio-economic causes or contexts for 
understanding the riots. Of course, various literature since August 2011 has commented, 
often critically, on the initial understandings evoked through political and media sources 
during and following the riots, whilst often trying to gain a more informed and complex 
understanding of why they happened (Dennis and Cavanagh, 2012; Fuchs, 2012; Taylor, 
2012; Milburn, 2012; Benyon, 2011; Younge, 2011; Reicher and Stott, 2011; Cavalcanti et 
al., 2012; Angel, 2012; Bridges, 2012; Ball and Drury, 2012; Dean, 2012; Jefferson, 2012; 
Lagrange, 2012; Lea and Hallsworth, 2012; Palmer, 2012; Waddington, 2012a; Waddington 
2012b). It is also true that other media sources at the time projected critical voices that sought 
to understand, more constructively (without excusing), why the riots happened (Carragher, 
2011:6; Batmanghelidjh, 2011). So it is important to recognise that media coverage and 
political responses to the riots were incredibly complex, especially in the right wing press that 
I consider in this article. Therefore, my awareness of such discursive complexity informs my 
approach to CDA, which is outlined below. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
My approach to this analysis shares common ground with the analytical frameworks that 
consider language from a functionalist perspective (Fowler, 1991; Simpson, 1993; 
Fairclough, 1995; Mayr, 2008; Richardson, 2007). As Fowler argues: ‘Anything that is said 
or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological position: language is not 
a clear window but a refracting, structuring medium’ (Fowler, 1991:10). Similar to the 
concerns expressed and agenda that is set through a moral panic, it is argued in CDA that 
discourse can restrict and allow certain discussions of a topic. Discourse is therefore seen as 
‘a culturally and socially organized way of speaking’ (Mayr, 2008:7). Analysing discourse in 
this context follows a traditional purpose to scholars of CDA: it challenges dominant power 
relations and attempt to tackle social inequality or misrepresentation (Van Dijk, 1998; 
Fairclough, 2005; Richardson, 2007; Wodak et al, 1999). Wodak also considers discourse-
historical traits by ‘tracing the historical (intertextual) history of phrases and arguments … 
and centres on political issues such as racism, integrating all available background 
information in the analysis and interpretation of the different layers of a text’ (2008:9).  
Similarly, the context of certain social identities being recognised as a threat relies on the 
discursive and historical knowledge gained previously before the immediate event concerned 
(van Dijk, 2001). Although I do not attempt to provide a discourse-historical analysis in this 
paper it is important to consider the context and knowledge that readers bring to a text, 
especially in their choice of newspaper (its political position in mind) and perspective on 
certain social identities. It is also the broader socio-political approach of CDA that provides 
me with a coherent framework and set of analytical tools for examining contemporary media 
texts.  
Norman Fairclough‘s approach to CDA attempted to ‘transcend the division between work 
inspired by social theory which tends not to analyse texts, and work which focuses upon the 
language of texts but tends not to engage with social theoretical issues’ (2003:2-3). As he 
puts it ‘discourse analysis is not merely the linguistic analysis of texts. I see discourse 
analysis as ‘oscillating‘ between a focus on specific texts and a focus on what I call the ‘order 
of discourse‘‘ (ibid:3). Fairlough‘s approach includes ‘interdiscursive analysis, that is, seeing 
texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate 
together’ (Fairclough, 2003:3). This enables a critical outlook on ‘the relatively durable 
structuring of language which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring and 
networking of social practices’ (ibid:3). CDA focuses ‘on the ways discourse structures enact, 
confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society’ 
(van Dijk, 1998:353) and, subsequently, takes an explicit socio-political position in its 
attempt to directly challenge problems in social relations. When there is a particular problem 
concerned, CDA is explicitly political in its approach regarding the social issue(s) being 
addressed. It is this socio-political position and discursive framework that I adopt below. 
Although, rather than close linguistic analysis of semantic structures and lexical detail (an 
approach often adopted by those CDA scholars above), my analysis draws on particular 
discourses through textual extracts as examples of common themes (or ‘news hooks’) and 
discussions that recurred in my sample.  
Whilst I examined every national, daily newspaper from 9
th
-12
th
 August, this analysis is 
based on 30 articles from three, right wing newspapers – Daily Mail, Sun, and Daily 
Telegraph – across the same time period. After summarising the front pages of daily, national 
papers on August 9
th
 (in order to provide a broad overview of responses to the riots after the 
initial days of violence) I then divide this analysis into three sections that explore the 
discursive complexities that I am concerned with across the right wing publications above. 
Whilst I examine all genres – news stories, columns, editorials – I acknowledge instances 
when columns and editorials are clearly providing opinion and often contributing to the 
discursive complexities of news across these publications. My focus begins by exploring 
examples from texts that directly opposed and suppressed discourses of social deprivation. I 
then consider the discursive mechanisms used to support the latter through the demographic 
profiles of an ‘unlikely mob’. But it is then the final section of analysis that shows how right 
wing discourses functioned paradoxically; complicating their own discursive position by 
supporting Conservative (or coalition) social policies aimed at the poorest sections of society 
(the sick society) that they had initially sought to exempt from sole responsibility for the 
riots.  
It is this approach to CDA that enables me to explore instances of paradoxical persuasion 
(Kelsey, 2012), which I return to in my analysis. As my previous work has shown, discursive 
complexities, contradictions and complications can be understood through analysis that 
addresses the broader ideological contexts, connections and influences, which are relevant to 
the production and consumption of texts. These elements can be highlighted through 
Fairclough’s three layered approach that considers: the text in terms of its language and 
representation; the discursive practice operating in the production and consumption of a text; 
the social practice concerned in how a discourse impacts upon society and how broader 
social practices have impacted upon the text. By going beyond the language of a text itself, 
we can explore these broader discursive and social practices that carry and reflect significant 
ideological constructs. It is within this framework that I use a number of analytical tools. I do 
not always explicitly refer back to these terms throughout my analysis. Rather, I define them 
here before I consider the following discursive traits: 
Hyperbole involves the excessive exaggeration of aspects within texts. Van Dijk describes 
hyperbole as the “description of an event or action in strongly exaggerated terms” in order to 
enhance its severity or justify particular actions in response (1995:154).  
Intertextuality refers to the interlinking of one text to other texts in both past and present 
contexts (Wodak, 2008:3). This might involve repeated references to the same events, or the 
transferring of ‘main arguments from one text into the next’ (ibid:3). This also applies for the 
recurrence and continued reference to main actors or topics within stories across texts’ 
(ibid:3).  
Interdiscursivity differs to intertextuality in the sense that it accounts for the fact that certain 
discourses are linked to each other in different ways across and within texts. As Wodak 
explains, ‘a discourse on un/employment often refers for example to topics of other 
discourses, such as gender or racism: arguments on systematically lower salaries for women 
or migrants might be included in discourses on employment’ (ibid:3). Topics of discourse 
tend to spread and overlap with other fields and discourses that are sometimes ‘socio-
functionally linked with each other’ (ibid:17). As we see discourses of unemployment, social 
class, welfare, and criminality, amongst other discourses become interlinked in responses to 
the riots.    
Modality accounts for the ‘different ways in which people can temper or qualify their 
messages and express attitudes and judgements of various kinds’ (Mayr, 2008:19). Modality 
often adopts an array of grammatical terms in order to express an attitude or judgement. 
These range from modal verbs (‘can’ ‘must’ ‘should’) to modal adverbs (‘obviously’, 
‘clearly’, ‘probably’, ‘perhaps’, ‘definitely’), copular verbs (‘is’, ‘seems’, ‘appears’) and 
cognition verbs (‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘feel’) (ibid:20). The person speaking or writing – 
politician or journalist – uses this vocabulary to deliver their judgment or attitude on the topic 
concerned. As I demonstrate below, modal language often sought to define one fixed reason 
for the riots or insist on necessary responses from the government and courts.   
Presupposition accounts for the ‘taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the 
explicit meaning of a text or utterance’ (Richardson, 2007:242). Presuppositions were both 
expressed or challenged through in responses to the riots in discussions about the social 
backgrounds and demographics of rioters.  
Predication considers the ‘words used to represent more directly the values and 
characteristics of social actors’ (Richardson, 2007:52). As Reisigl and Wodak point out, 
predicational strategies provide ‘the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning 
qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena’ (2001:52).  
Symptoms over causes concern the attention that is given to the outcome of events, like the 
devastation and suffering caused, but with little effort made to explain why it has happened. 
Interestingly, in this analysis there are simultaneous efforts to suppress and discuss 
symptoms, according to the source and ideological interests concerned.   
With the tools and approaches covered in this section in mind, through the contextual depth 
and complexity that this framework of CDA enables us to explore, we can address the 
ideological operations concerned. We can explain how discourses that appear contradictory 
on one level still maintain a consistent political position and ideological influence on another. 
This analysis will now investigate those mechanisms that operate within and beyond the texts 
in my sample. 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Yobs, mobs and morons: Setting the scenes of anarchy  
The front page headlines below feature the foreground coverage of harder crimes, dramatic 
images and focus on the police in order to depict the level of destruction caused by rioters. 
Unsurprisingly, these featured anarchistic symbols of burning cars, fires, flames from 
buildings, masked looters and acts of vandalism. This was understandably a discourse of civil 
disobedience that framed the extent of disorder. The Daily Mail, Daily Express, Guardian, i-
newspaper, Daily Star, and Sun all used the image of a man in a hooded tracksuit and masked 
face in the foreground with a burning car behind him in Hackney. The Independent and 
Mirror both used another picture taken in Hackney of a man, again with his face covered, 
holding a can of Special Brew lager in the foreground, walking across a burning car in the 
background. The Telegraph and Times showed dramatic images of burning buildings with the 
former showing a member of the public jumping from a window to escape a fire. As the 
headlines accompanying these images show, themes of anarchy and mob rule were 
prominent: 
FLAMING MORONS, THUGS AND THIEVES TERRORISE BRITAIN’S STREETS 
(Daily Express, August 9
th
, 2011) 
THE ANARCHY SPREADS (Daily Mail, August 9
th
, 2011) 
YOB RULE (Daily Mirror, August 9
th
, 2011) 
ANARCHY IN THE UK (Daily Star, August 9
th
, 2005) 
RULE OF THE MOB (Daily Telegraph, August 9
th
, 2011) 
MOB RULE (The Independent, August 9
th
, 2011) 
ANARCHY (The Sun, August 9
th
, 2011) 
MOBS RULE AS POLICE SURRENDER STREETS (The Times, August 9th, 2011) 
OUT OF CONTROL: RIOTS REACH CRISIS POINT (i-newspaper, August 9th, 2011) 
THE BATTLE FOR LONDON (The Guardian, August 9
th
, 2011) 
It is worth noting that the Guardian and Independent were more focussed on the police’s 
efforts and position in the conflict than the other newspapers, which – despite the 
Independent’s headline above – featured more prominent references to ‘the mob’ and 
discussions about those within it. Nonetheless, the notion that the police had lost control of 
the streets still prevailed. The headlines above are not surprising but they do provide the 
foundations for complex discursive elements that featured thereafter. They also set a context 
for the resistance that occurred in efforts to suppress certain explanations for the riots. As 
psychologists Reicher and Stott argue:  
So the accusation of mindlessness, the lazy language of the ‘mob’… is not just wrong. 
It is positively dangerous. It stops us paying attention to what crowd actions tells us 
about how rioters understand their society. It stops us from addressing how these 
understandings come about. It dooms us to more disaffection, more division and more 
violence (2011). 
At this stage, the notion of mob rule and anarchy on London’s streets suggested the law and 
order of a civilised society had been compromised by a mindless group who were detached 
from society – rather than a group who were products of society or held a conscious view on 
their role (or lack of a role) in society. It is now my sample of the right wing press that I pay 
closer attention to in this analysis. 
Suppressing cynical lefties: The discourse of criminality (pure and simple) 
The Daily Mail accompanied its August 9
th
, front page headline, ‘THE ANARCHY 
SPREADS’, with an extract from its comment page: ‘To blame the cuts is immoral and 
cynical. This is criminality pure and simple’ (August 9th, 2011). Political Editor, Tim 
Shipman’s article was also headlined, ‘LEFT WING CYNICS BLAME THE TORY CUTS 
FOR THE MAYHEM’ (August 9th, 2011:8). He said: 
Left-wing politicians have cynically sought to make political capital out of the riots, 
blaming government cuts for the orgy of violence. Labour MPs and activists lined up 
to make excuses for the thugs, spouting claims that disadvantaged youth had no 
option but to smash up high streets’ (ibid:8). 
Both Shipman’s article and the comment piece in the Mail criticised the BBC for the 
attention they gave to community workers who were blaming cuts and social deprivation for 
the riots:  
Much of the violence and widespread looting which has swept across London can be 
blamed on government cuts, poverty and homelessness, if you believe the BBC (ibid: 
8);  
Inevitably, the BBC is determinedly helping to peddle this myth – seeking out 
community leaders who blame a lack of youth clubs for the looting, and revelling in 
footage of Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg being harangued by residents blaming 
‘Coalition cuts’ (August 9th, 2011:12). 
The Mail’s position here was common throughout responses to the riots (including other 
media, public and political sources beyond the scope of this analysis). In fact, the Mail 
provided their own community source, Lindsay Johns, to counter this view. Under the 
headline, ‘A STINGING REBUKE FROM AN INNER-CITY YOUTH WORKER: 
APOLOGISTS FOR THESE THUGS SHOULD HANG THEIR HEADS IN SHAME’, he 
argued:  
We are told the rioters have been motivated by their rage at inequality, deprivation 
and unemployment. Some have blamed police brutality; others have wailed about 
‘Tory cuts’ or the closure of youth clubs. But such explanations are as misguided as 
they’re immoral. In reality, there is no justification for the outbreak of carnage that’s 
gripped the capital (Johns, August 9
th
, 2011:12). 
Like the Mail’s comment piece, the riots themselves were not just seen as acts of immorality; 
those seeking to provide political and social explanations were immoral too. In depoliticising 
the context of the riots it is interesting that Johns blamed ‘mindless criminality’ and 
‘opportunistic materialism’ as explanations for looting: ‘What we witnessed was despicable. 
Far from representing a political act, it was nothing more than a mixture of mindless 
criminality and opportunistic materialism’ (ibid:12). 
On 9
th
 August, the Sun featured a two page spread a discourse of mindless violence. 
Headlined, ‘RABBLE WITHOUT A CAUSE’ under a title banner saying, ‘THUGS’ ORGY 
OF MINDLESS VIOLENCE’ (Crick et al., 2011:5), witnesses provided accounts. The 
following witness statements echo Ken Clarke’s description of a ‘feral underclass’ and 
Cameron’s claims of family breakdown:  
There were little kids running around everywhere. They can’t have been much older 
than eight. They were telling their older brothers when police were on the move. … 
An off-duty bus driver said ‘They were like animals. It’s very frightening’.  
The Sun’s editorial column the same day commented, ‘As The Sun has said, this has nothing 
to do with protests over the shooting of a Tottenham man by police. This is anarchy, pure and 
simple’ (2011:8) Whilst this is similar to the Daily Mail’s response (‘criminality’, ‘pure and 
simple’) it is also concerned with distancing the riots from any association with a protest 
against the police.  
The Daily Telegraph on August 9
th
 did feature more articles about general policing issues, 
calls for more aggressive police strategies, and other concerns about online threats from 
rioters’ organisation via social networks. However, its coverage still reflected a similar, 
oppositional and critical voice against arguments that connected the riots with the economic 
crisis, austerity and social deprivation. For example, the Telegraph’s editorial comment on 9th 
August argued that ‘real’ communities were being overlooked because of soft excuses for 
criminality:  
The word ‘community’, heard so often in the past few days, has become a euphemism 
for an allegedly disfranchised group of young men and women whose alienation from 
the mainstream of society is used to excuse criminal behaviour. For years, the police 
have been encouraged to ‘engage’ with these people. But the real community surely 
comprises the law-abiding majority (2011:21). 
Its other main point supported the response of David Lammy as a voice of opposition against 
‘bleeding heart liberals’ who sought to explain the ‘mindlessness’ and ‘greed’ of rioters: 
The view of this real community is not to be heard in the sentiments of bleeding heart 
liberals, who always find an explanation for such behaviour beyond opportunistic 
greed and mindless vandalism. Rather, it was provided by David Lammy, the local 
Labour MP. His unequivocal condemnation of the rioters needs to be replicated by 
others in his party who have, grotesquely, blamed Government spending cuts for the 
disorder (ibid:21). 
Notably, this was an instance when a discourse of materialism and greed appeared without 
mobilising further socio-economic commentary on a consumer society or wider societal 
structures. Furthermore, as Bridges argues in his research, the conclusions that Lammy drew 
from the riots were significantly flawed in the insight they provided: 
Many would dispute Lammy’s description of current police-black community 
relations, whether in Tottenham or elsewhere in London and other cities. For 
example, in the three months to the end of June 2011, there were 6,894 police stop 
and searches in the local borough of Haringey, with only eighty-seven of these 
resulting in an arrest and conviction. London-wide and national statistics consistently 
show that stop and searches have increased steadily and are directed 
disproportionately at black and Asian youth in particular (2012:4-5)  
But it should be noted that a Telegraph column printed next to its own editorial comment 
provided a similar opinion to that of which it was criticising. Under the headline, ‘THE 
UNDERCLASS IS LASHING OUT AT A BRITAIN THAT HAS TURNED ITS BACK’, 
columnist Mary Riddell blamed the left and right for their neglect of a social underclass and 
the growing inequalities of society during an economic crisis:  
The real causes are more insidious. It is no coincidence that the worst violence 
London has seen in many decades takes place against the backdrop of a global 
economy poised for freefall. The causes of recession set out by J K Galbraith in his 
book, The Great Crash 1929, were as follows: bad income distribution, a business 
sector engaged in ‘corporate larceny’, a weak banking structure and an import/export 
imbalance. … Today, Britain is less equal, in wages, wealth and life chances, than at 
any time since then. Last year alone, the combined fortunes of the 1,000 richest 
people in Britain rose by 30 per cent to £333.5 billion (2011:20). 
This was an isolated piece in the Telegraph but it is still interesting that editorially there was 
space for this variation and complexity, if only as an exception to the general rule. Although 
Riddell acknowledged that reductionist arguments blaming just the cuts or race relations are 
too simplistic she did attempt to provide an economically critical perspective:  
This is not a cri de coeur for the failed and failing. Nor is it a lament for the 
impoverished. Mob violence, despicable and inexcusable, must always be 
condemned. But those terrorising and trashing London are also a symptom of a wider 
malaise (ibid:20).  
It is not entirely surprising that this column appeared; since comment sections do allow space 
for variation of opinion that might differ to the general editorial values of the paper. 
However, the thorough and critically engaging account from Riddell was printed next to the 
Telegraph’s editorial comment that day, which directly dismissed the type of explanation that 
she provided. 
So it is clear from the discursive elements considered above that these newspapers made 
explicit attempts to critically oppose voices that sought to provide ‘sympathetic’ explanations 
for the riots. It was this discursive mechanism that developed into instances of blame towards 
political correctness hindering police efforts to control the violence. For example, amongst 
various articles supporting aggressive police tactics to control the riots, James Slack’s 
analysis article in the Daily Mail featured the headline: ‘Rudderless Met Crippled by 
liberalism’. Slack argued that political correctness – mainly due to the Stephen Lawrence 
case – hindered police efforts to control the riots:  
The appalling handling of the heinous murder of Stephen was born out of 
incompetence, yet the Macpherson inquiry branded the police ‘institutionally racist’ – 
and they have been doing their hands tied behind their backs ever since, especially 
considering large numbers of the protagonists are black teenagers (12
th
 August, 2011: 
11) 
The Sun’s associate editor, Trevor Kavanagh evoked similar accusations of blame whilst also 
referring to issues of benefits and social welfare:  
So, who is responsible and what can we do about it? Well, don’t blame the police on 
the streets of Hackney, Croydon or Brixton for letting Britain down. Blame their 
politically-correct commanders and the handwringing politicians who adopt the cringe 
position when the ‘underprivileged’ resort to violence. Blame the Macpherson Report 
which emasculated our police by branding the entire force ‘institutionally racist’. 
Blame lawmakers like Justice Secretary Ken Clarke or Labour’s ‘equalities’ crusader 
Harriet Harman who believe a slap on the wrist is the answer. And blame hypocrites 
like Ken Livingstone and the race relations industry who have made a good living out 
of grievance politics and the victimhood of workshy whingers (2011:12-13).  
These instances demonstrate how various interdiscursive mechanisms were cutting into the 
construction of blame and calls for harder policing and judicial responses – an issue that I 
return to below.
2
 What is also interesting about Kavanagh’s piece is that he resorted to a 
criticism of the welfare state; contradicting other discourses, which argued that immorality 
transcended social class. It is those instances where class complexity complicated discourses 
of blame, class and morality that I address below.  
 An unlikely mob and the case of Laura Johnson: A discourse of confusion (and 
paradoxical persuasion) in representations of the accused 
In this section I consider some of the discursive dynamics that functioned as ‘paradoxically 
persuasive’ (Kelsey, 2012) mechanisms of discourse; serving an immediate (albeit 
contradictory) purpose that still maintained a broader, social and political agenda. In previous 
work I have considered how certain stories or discursive features might appear to contradict 
the ideological interests or political position of a particular source or newspaper (which we 
understand through the contextual and historical knowledge that we bring to our readings of 
texts). Despite the apparent contradictions that occur, a more nuanced contextual reading 
considers how different discursive mechanisms serve particular purposes in immediate and 
temporary environments. This reading can actually help to make sense of the ideological 
positions that are maintained through such ‘contradictions’ rather than compromising the 
broader interests that they serve. Particularly in the case of Laura Johnson, we see a 
temporary purpose served: Johnson was used as a discursive device to oppose suggestions 
that the riots were a product of social deprivation. But these stories actually complicate and 
contradict later developments in other stories when the government targeted housing benefits 
(which I address below) in order to punish some rioters in addition to their legal convictions. 
Despite the contradictions across these stories and events, the ideological consistency that 
these discourses serve, operates beyond the contradictory foreground in a longitudinal context 
that functions beyond their immediate production and purpose. Hence the stories covered 
below, within the broader discursive landscape that I cover in this article, can be interpreted 
through this understanding of paradoxical persuasion.    
Before considering the discourse of confusion that occurred when rioters appeared in court it 
is important to recognise the context of a moral public versus the immoral (‘scum’) rioters 
that had been established beforehand. Discourses of community defiance against the riots 
were often mobilised through two stories: large voluntary groups turning out for street clean 
ups; and members of the public physically defending their streets against rioters. The clean 
ups featured images of the public with brooms often held in the air to imply defiance and 
victory. A girl with a message written across her top saying ‘LOOTERS ARE SCUM’ also 
featured as a large image in the Sun and Mail. Whilst these discourses juxtaposed the moral 
consensus of law abiding citizens with the faceless identity of the ‘mob’ (or ‘scum’) this 
binary construction was interrupted by the profiles of the accused appearing in court: 
‘POSTMAN, SCHOOL MENTOR, CHARITY WORKER, LIFEGUARD, BOY OF 11. 
THE UNLIKELY RIOTERS HAULED TO COURT’ (Greenwood, August 11th, 2011:6-7).  
Acknowledging the ‘unlikely’ profiles here this article recognised an element of unexpected 
complexity in the demographic profile of rioters: ‘But while the trouble has been largely 
blamed on feral teenagers, many of those paraded before the courts yesterday led apparently 
respectful lives’. The Daily Telegraph’s front page that day invoked Cameron’s phrase in 
response to the riots, with the headline, ‘Our sick society’, which was accompanied by the 
following: ‘As Cameron condemns riots, suspected looters in court include a boy of 11, a 
grammar school girl, and a teaching assistant’ (Gilligan, 2011:1).  
Another Telegraph headline on the same day, said: ‘GIRL WHO HAS IT ALL IS 
ACCUSED OF THEFT’, and provided a detailed account of Laura Johnson: ‘Laura Johnson 
appears as far removed as possible from the lawless ‘underclass’ said to have been blighting 
Britain’s streets’ (Whitehead and Watt, 2011:3). In Gilligan’s article he also wrote, ‘They 
were, some told us, the alienated poor, those without hope, lashing out in rage and despair. 
But as the accused London rioters started appearing in court they included university 
students, a rich businessman’s daughter and a boy of 11’ (2011:1-2). Even within Gilligan’s 
article there is another implicit understanding of a ‘type’ of person who fits the profile of 
Cameron’s ‘sick society’:  
Most defendants conformed more closely to Mr Cameron's ‘sick society’ template. 
There was Richard Myles-Palmer, with a foot-long list of convictions, found wheeling 
a shopping trolley full of stolen power tools through south London. He and his co-
defendant, Jason Gary White, pleaded guilty. Humble in the dock in their white issue 
T-shirts, they were transformed men when they emerged from court, masked up and 
making hand signals of defiance (Gilligan, 2011:2). 
Gilligan’s reference to ‘most defendants’ holding previous convictions is also problematic. 
Ball and Drury have explained in their research that statistics were used inaccurately – and 
ideologically – in response to the riots, arguing that ‘it is very likely that those who were 
arrested and/or charged, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the August riots, were 
primarily those with (extensive) criminal records whose faces were uncovered and secondly 
those who had no previous record but were unmasked’ (2012:12). As they point out, due to 
the use of CCTV the former group were far more likely to be arrested than any other due the 
police records that were used to identify unmasked individuals (ibid:12). It was also the case 
that police authorities recognised this bias in statistics, as demonstrated by an exchange 
between Acting Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Tim Godwin, and the Home 
Affairs Committee during the weeks following the riots.
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 In response to Gilligan’s report at 
the time, this is important since its prepsupposition partly informs support for harder judicial 
responses.   
The Sun’s front page on August 11th also listed the occupations of some of the accused: 
‘LIFEGUARD, POSTMAN, HAIRDRESSER, TEACHER, MILLIONAIRE’S 
DAUGHTER, CHEF AND SCHOOLBOY 11’ followed by a story across pages 4 and 5, 
headlined, ‘MANSION GATES TO MAGISTRATES’ (Sabey et al., 2011:4-5). A heading 
across the top of the page also said, ‘RIOT COURTS MEET AN UNLIKELY MOB’. Before 
covering the various identities of the accused and their occupations it focused on Laura 
Johnson:  
A teenage girl hauled into court for allegedly being part of a mob of 200 looters is the 
privileged daughter of millionaire parents. Laura Johnson, 19 - one of dozens to 
appear in court yesterday - is said to have been arrested behind the wheel of a car 
filled with stolen electrical goods, cigarettes and alcohol worth over £6,000. … 
Privately-educated Johnson has two brothers. Neighbour David Turner said: ‘They are 
a nice, respectable family. They never caused any problems.’ (ibid:4-5) 
It is significant that this featured a background source expressing such surprise, describing 
the Johnson’s as a ‘nice, respectable family’. The concept of feral teenagers or family 
background is implicitly excluded from the Johnson family profile, unlike those of other 
rioters that fit the more predictable stereotype of a ‘sick society’ that I explore below. But this 
was a subtle exception to the rule with most responses making an example of Johnson. For 
example, the front page of the Daily Mail on August 12
th
 featured a picture of Laura Johnson, 
next to the main story and headline stating ‘YOU’RE A DISGRACE TO YOUR 
COUNTRY’ (2011:1). Page 7 then featured a story about Johnson: ‘A STAR PUPIL FROM 
£1M HOME. HOW DID SHE END UP IN THE DOCK?’ This article was primarily focused 
on the disbelief that someone from such a background had got involved in looting: 
Whatever the reasons for Laura's ignominious predicament, they appear to have 
nothing to do with alienation or despair; not that this is any excuse for the shameful 
events that have scarred the country this week. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine 
a young woman with a brighter future; a future which has now been jeopardised; 
perhaps irrevocably so (Bracchi, 2011:7). 
Another Daily Mail article showed how complex (and contradictory) this discourse became in 
Richard Littlejohn’s column; materialism and moralism were a central point of blame in his 
column. He used Enfield as an example of an area that did not support the concept of social 
deprivation: 
Enfield isn’t a deprived inner-city ghetto, it’s a peaceful middle-class suburb. The 
disturbances there weren’t a protest against police brutality. A few hooligans figured 
the police would be so busy down the road in Tottenham that it was the perfect 
opportunity to rob the local Vodafone dealer (August 9
th, 2011:15). … One thing is 
certain: this wasn’t about poverty, not in the material sense. If there’s poverty, it’s 
spiritual poverty, moral poverty and poverty of ambition (ibid:15)
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In this instance Littlejohn suggested that materialism and greed transcend social class – partly 
due to the location of the riots. His efforts to clarify what is ‘certain’ about the riots reflected 
a recurring, modal tendency in language throughout responses to the riots; an ideological 
motivation to establish an absolute ‘truth’ about what was happening. In the context of this 
being a Daily Mail article – and the broader discursive knowledge of what these responses 
were suppressing in their opposition to discourses of deprivation – it is clear that this was not 
an attempt to mobilise critical discourses of structural issues in society, and/or the economic 
context of materialistic greed and consumption, as cultural products of consumerism. Rather, 
this was another instance of what became a fragmented field of confusing and inconsistent 
discourses seeking to argue that the immoral ‘others’ in society transcended social class.  
A two page spread in the Daily Mail on August 12
th 
continued to highlight the spread of 
social demographics across looter profiles that transcended social class. Under the caption 
‘CHILDREN, GRADUATES, A MUSICIAN… THE COURT MARATHON GOES ON’ 
these pages features images and accounts of rioters including: an aspiring musician who stole 
a violin; a student and Baptist Church mentor who looted a jewellery shop; an estate agent 
accused of attempted theft from PC World; and a ballet student who looted two flat screen 
televisions. On this spread the Mail ran a piece, headlined: SHAMELESS! JAILING OF A 
TV LOOKALIKE’. This article was about a man who was jailed for assaulting a police 
officer and was compared as a lookalike of Shameless television show character, Frank 
Gallagher. Clearly relying on the stereotype evoked by this comparison, it described Bernard 
Moore as follows:  
Moore, 46, a beggar and Big Issue seller who came to Britain from America, has a 
previous conviction for a public order offence. He lives on a sink estate in Collyhurst, 
north Manchester with a young woman, calls himself Brian and like Frank Gallagher 
has several children who don’t live with him. Moore begs every day in Manchester 
city centre and hangs around with drug addicts who take heroin and crack cocaine. 
Every night on his way back to his flat, he buys White Ace cider and Special Brew 
from a local off licence with loose change (Narain, 2012:5).   
Interdiscursively, there are a number of issues that surface in the account of this individual, 
including discourses of: drugs and alcohol; family breakdown; unemployment (implicitly 
relating to social welfare and benefits); crime and immigration (with a direct link between 
these two discursive aspects depicting an immigrant with a record of a ‘previous conviction’). 
This is exemplary of a discourse that concentrated on symptoms rather than causes of social 
issues. Despite the class complexities that surround it in discourses transcending social class 
on the same page, it reverts to a common stereotype, aimed to identify (or construct) a 
common problem. It is also an example of the discursive elements that informed proposed 
legislative responses to the riots, as we see below in discourses of social welfare. 
Redefining the mob: Punishing the poor through Conservative social policy 
The complexities and inconsistencies of discursive elements considered thus far should 
remain in mind when considering the legislative responses (and discursive support) that 
developed for Conservative measures on welfare and judicial punishments over the days 
concerned. The discourses considered in this section demonstrate the contradictory 
mechanisms that I began to highlight above. Responses that sought to deal with (or punish) 
rioters and cure a sick society reverted from the discursive positions covered in the previous 
section; subsequently contradicting previous constructions of a moral underclass that 
transcended the social spectrum. The Daily Mail’s own opinion piece, in a closing comment, 
said: ‘Indeed, if anything, it was Labour’s nurturing of a benefits culture, in which youngsters 
believe there is no need to work to have a comfortable lifestyle, which sowed the seeds of the 
riots – not any ‘Coalition cuts’’ (August 9th, 2011:12). Whilst there is a distinct effort to 
suppress the blame aimed at austerity and deprivation, a comment like this brings political 
responsibility back into play; it argues that government policy is significant and that the riots 
could be linked to issues of social welfare, but only in support of a conservative policy 
agenda. Similarly, the Daily Mail’s comment piece on August 11th praised Cameron’s 
response and recognition of a ‘sick society’ whilst defining what this society consisted of: 
Meanwhile, the doling out of ever more benefits to the jobless has instilled a 
something-for-nothing entitlement culture which culminated in children as young as 
11 this week looting shops. David Cameron, in a robust performance yesterday, 
finally indicated that he understands the crisis facing Britain, parts of which he 
correctly identified as being 'sick', rife with family breakdown and in need of urgent 
social repair. The bitter irony, after the mayhem of the past few days, is that if he were 
to boldly seize the opportunity to fix Britain's broken welfare state, law and order 
system, immigration controls and parlous family structures, would find an electorate 
devastated by what it has witnessed fully behind him (August 11
th
, 2011:14).
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Delivered within the context of unemployment and welfare, these references to a ‘something-
for-nothing entitlement culture’ and ‘family breakdown’ demonstrate that cases like Laura 
Johnson were only mentioned as exceptions to the rule, or to serve a temporary purpose.
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Also, and in line with conventional conservative ideals, the interdiscursive mechanisms 
above bound together right wing perspectives on welfare, justice, immigration and family 
values. As the following examples show, the depoliticised actions of rioters were eventually 
redefined as a politicised problem; a problem responsible for a sick society, to be cured by 
Conservative policy.  
For example, two articles in the Sun on August 11
th
 – either side of the ‘mansion gates to 
magistrates’ article earlier – featured a link between the riots and welfare culture through 
Cameron’s response. Their positioning and layout is significant since they provide 
contradictions either side of an article that constructs a moral underclass transcending the 
social spectrum. Headlined, ‘PM Vow: I will Cure sick society’, one article said: ‘In his 
emergency statement to the Commons today Mr Cameron will say we must restore discipline 
and end the something-for-nothing culture’ (2011:4). Another article, on the same two-page 
spread, headlined, ‘New law will evict riot thugs’ said, ‘Rioters and looters will be booted out 
of their council homes, the Government said yesterday. Housing minister Grant Shapps plans 
to extend powers to evict ‘neighbours from hell’ to include riot yobs’ (2011:5). The issue of 
social welfare recurred in the Sun’s August 12th comment piece. Under the headline, ‘STOP 
BENEFITS’, it projected a tenuous construction of public consensus on the issue of 
suspending benefits for rioters: ‘MORE than 100,000 people last night demanded a 
Commons debate on axing benefits for convicted rioters. The No10 website crashed as angry 
Brits tried to sign an e-petition calling for tough sanctions’ (Sun, 2011:9) 
However, it is worth noting that the Sun’s tone was not always completely supportive of 
Cameron if it did not feel his response to crime was hard enough. Its comment piece on 
August 12
th
 said: ‘Mr Cameron also vowed to tackle the gang culture in our cities. We've 
heard that before. To stamp out gangs we need less of the PM’s Big Society guff and more 
action against criminals, together with extra jails and proper sentences with no early release’ 
(p 8). Whilst Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ is already a controversial issue, the Sun’s position is 
clear; interdiscursively, this argument concentrates less on community relations and more on 
harder approaches to justice, law and order. But this reflects a problematic, presupposed 
notion of extensive gang involvement in the riots. As Bridges points out: 
It was reported that, during the riots, ‘gangs suspended any ordinary hostilities 
between each other to focus on other targets’ thus enabling young people to gather to 
protest against the police in different localities. However, it is also clear from both 
arrest and survey data that the involvement of gangs in co-ordinating the riots was 
greatly exaggerated at the time (2012:5)  
Nonetheless, gangs in this instance were projected as another sick element of society that 
could be reformed through harder, Conservative policy. A similar occurrence on August 12
th
, 
the front page of the Daily Telegraph, provided a more direct criticism of Cameron. Under 
the headline, ‘BACK ON THE STREETS’, it said, ‘Despite tough action promised by 
Cameron, child looters are freed by the courts… and they even keep their anonymity’ 
(2011:1). Clearly implying that judicial procedures were not hard enough, this suggests that 
laws around youth and anonymity should be compromised due to the severity of crimes 
committed. In the Daily Mail on August 12
th
, youth worker, Winston Smith wrote a piece 
criticising the justice system and what he saw as Cameron’s pseudo-tough approach to 
punishment. Under the headline ‘TOUGH SENTENCES? FORGET IT. THESE TEEN 
YOBS WILL BE TREATED AS IF THEY ARE THE VICTIMS’, he said: 
David Cameron may have sounded tough this promising night curfews, tougher 
sentencing and new police powers…. But the Prime Minister is sorely mistaken if he 
thinks the rioters will punished and made to pay for what they’ve done. Why? 
Because the criminal justice system in this country is broken (2011:14).
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Interdiscursive mechanisms in Smith’s article connected various policy issues through the 
perception of interrelated problems; criticisms of sentencing powers, a ‘laughable’ penal 
system, and criminal activity were bound up with criticisms of social welfare and 
immigration policy:  
I have escorted a 16-year-old, unemployed, criminal teenager by taxi from his home 
to the benefits office so he could sign on for the dole, even though he lived only ten 
minutes away by foot. He was from a large Albanian family of Romany gypsies who 
had come to Britain seeking asylum, but each had ended up involved in criminal 
activities, including violent muggings and burglary (ibid:14).  
This also contributed to another dismissal and criticism of ‘bleeding heart liberals’:  
Despite his criminal conduct — because of it, in fact — the local youth offending 
team was desperate for him to claim as many benefits as possible, even laying on 
transport. The bizarre logic, as it was put to me, was that poverty was the cause of his 
illegal actions (a trite and misguided argument trotted out this week by bleeding heart 
liberals in defence of the looters) (ibid:14).  
These criticisms (in all three newspapers) of Cameron, and the judicial legislation in place at 
the time, demonstrated that this was not a simple case of supporting the current, Conservative 
government. Rather, this discursive position indicates that, ideologically, the government 
needed to follow traditional Conservative values and a harder approach to social and legal 
policy in order to cure a ‘sick society’.  
A Telegraph article on August 11
th
 echoed Cameron’s response on welfare policy, implying 
that he needed to convince the public that his response would be hard enough. Headlined, 
‘WE WILL MAKE RIOTERS SUFFER, SAYS MP’, it explained, ‘David Cameron will 
announce a range of measures today aimed at convincing the public that rioters will face 
serious jail sentences and the loss of council homes and benefits’ (Kirkup and Porter, 2011: 
4). To ‘convince the public’ that these measures will be carried out presupposed that there 
was a public consensus calling for them already. The discursive mechanisms that sought to 
condone a conservative review of social welfare policy through legislative punishments relied 
on this juxtaposition of a moral public consensus against a dishonourable, moral underclass. 
Despite the social complexities that were clearly acknowledged across some vast, discursive 
ground (above), right wing discourses still blamed and punished those that, in other cases, it 
claimed were not centrally responsible for the riots. These discursive nuances and 
paradoxical mechanisms maintain a connection and consistency through their ideological 
support for the socio-economic and ‘moral’ agenda of Conservative approaches to social 
welfare and penal policy.  
  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has considered the complexities in right wing discourses that depoliticised the 
actions of rioters in one context before politicising them as products of society in another. 
This depoliticisation worked to suppress arguments that suggested there were political 
contexts that could explain the riots from perspectives which were critical of government 
policy, expressing concerns regarding social class, deprivation and disillusioned youth in 
certain communities. When these discourses became repoliticised they were critical of 
communities themselves and specific demographics, which were viewed as a problem 
produced by parts of society and the political system (social welfare) that needed to be 
changed (punishment via benefit reduction). Hence the discursive inconsistencies that 
appeared contradictory in one sense could be explained ideologically when considered in the 
context of the right wing press; in the arguments that were suppressed initially and those that 
were later mobilised in order to support government policy through a presupposed connection 
between criminality and social welfare.  
For example, the discourses considered above often focused on issues of crime and morality 
that transcended social class; various stories covered the ‘respectable’ backgrounds and 
occupations of those in court, especially in the case of Laura Johnson. These discourses often 
functioned as a mechanism for suppressing or responding to criticisms that initially blamed 
community relations with the police, government policy, austerity, social isolation and 
disillusionment when the riots started. But the suppressive role that complex representations 
of social class played, were also a hindrance to simplistic definitions of a ‘sick society’ that 
blamed the welfare state. Laura Johnson provided a useful tool for opposing certain 
arguments. But the broader language and context of these media and political responses still 
reverted to perceptions of a ‘sick society’ concerning lower social classes. Therefore, I have 
argued that cases like Johnson functioned as ‘paradoxically persuasive’ mechanisms. The 
ideological interests that bind these discursive dynamics together override contradictory 
messages by “making sense” through the consistent purpose that they serve.  
It was also the case that right wing discourses did not just suppress criticisms of government 
cuts and austerity; they actually used the context of the riots to legitimise other financial 
penalties on poorer social groups that have not been considered in this analysis. For example, 
the Riots Communities and Victims Panel recommended ‘schools should face financial 
penalties (rather than additional support) should they fail to achieve age-related literacy 
standards among their pupils and appoint ‘business ambassadors’ to promote youth 
employment’ (Bridges, 2012:9). The latter is not only evidence of political interests furthered 
through responses to the riots, but, like the suspensions of housing benefit, these issues are 
specifically aimed at those from less privileged backgrounds. Therefore, this analysis has 
noted a similar problem to that identified by Bridges. As he points out, when the riot panel 
report touched on structural issues in society it still seemed to lack a sense of recognition 
regarding the true depth and severity of economic troubles and austerity cuts, especially in 
relation to their urban impact (2012:9). Similarly, the right wing press did refer to certain 
issues (like greed, materialism, and class complexity) that should, arguably, be considered in 
a nuanced, sociological and economic understanding of the riots. But then they reverted to 
traditional, Conservative ideological values in calls to cure a ‘sick society’. 
It is important to recognise that this article has not attempted to propose one, fixed answer for 
why the riots happened or who was to blame. The modal claims of a ‘truth’ or ‘certainty’ 
about the riots functioned in a binary context where a particular set of ‘facts’ would establish 
some clear explanation whilst suppressing the complexity of other relevant (and reported) 
issues. I do not propose from this analysis that the constructions and discursive trends 
explored above were planned conspiratorially either. Rather, I showed that oppositional 
arguments sporadically drew on convenient examples and observations depending on the 
immediate purpose that they served. It is interesting that such contradictions occurred across 
media discourses whilst continuing to provide strong, populist arguments. This is not to say 
that all readers and audiences follow the same viewpoints, but it does highlight the negotiated 
material that readers and audiences grapple with – consciously or not – on a daily basis. It is 
important that discourse analysts continue to scrutinise the complicated constructions of 
political discourse. It is naïve to assume that the political bias of news providers equates to 
predictable, consistent and monolithically ideological constructions in news stories. 
Discourse does not work so simply. Discourse is complex and context is important. 
Discursive nuances, contradictions and paradoxical mechanisms can be understood when we 
reflect upon the ideological contexts of their production and consumption. This is the level 
and depth at which analysts can understand the complicated discursive landscapes that 
operate across multiple social contexts and environments. We do not always see, or 
experience, what we expect in the discursive exchanges that we engage in. But understanding 
the discursive and ideological operations that function beyond the immediate text enables us 
to scrutinise the sources concerned and understand the interests of power that they serve.  
Hence, it is essential for critical analysts to continue to explore the subtle, complicated and 
persuasive representations of media and political sources. 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 ‘Its final report … resonates with the Victorian values and underlying notions of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor 
found in David Lammy’s book. Both are also reminiscent in their analysis of the type of ‘culture of poverty’ thinking found 
in the infamous Moynihan report following the American urban disorders of the 1960s.29 This focuses on what are seen as 
the personal defects and social development problems of rioters – their lack of ‘resilience’, inability to ‘defer gratification’, 
ill-discipline, absent fathers and lack of ‘proper role models’ – rather than attempting to address the sources of their 
grievances or structural factors in society. It is as though the Panel, in reaching its conclusion that it is necessary to give the 
rioters ‘a stake in society’, failed ever to consider what sort of society Britain has become.’ (Bridges, 2012:8).  
2 It should be noted that discourses of race during the same sample and time period are in need of closer, detailed analysis 
but function beyond the scope of this article. Slack’s Daily Mail article shows how discourses of morality and race overlap 
and are interconnected beyond any point of clear separation.  
3 Dr Huppert: ‘Whereas the Mayor was saying that most of the people involved were known to police and that we should be 
dealing with that group of people, you are saying that, in fact, that is just an artefact of the fact they are the first people you 
rounded up; is that correct?’ 
Tim Godwin: ‘That may well turn out to be the case, because we still have lots of images to go through and obviously the 
ones that you know are going to be arrested first.’ 
(Ball and Drury, 2012:12) 
4 The Sun’s front page on August 12th featured the case of Chelsea Ives, from Enfield. Under the headline, ‘Olympic girl, 18 
'trashed cop car'‘, it said, ‘A teenage girl accused of wrecking a police car in the riots is a London Olympics ambassador. 
Chelsea Ives, 18, was arrested after her parents allegedly saw her on TV during the mayhem in Enfield and called police. 
Mum Adrienne, 43, said: ‘I have no regrets. I love my daughter but she was brought up to know right from wrong.’ 
Prosecutor Becky Owens claimed Chelsea had shouted to a friend: ‘This is the best day ever!’ - then hurled a rock at a shop 
window’ (Syson, August 12th, 2011:1). 
5 A Sun letter on 12th also said: ‘And it's not about being rich or poor. There are opportunities out there for young people to 
attend training or become part of a local project or community. The issue is a lack of ambition, the expectation that they 
should get something for nothing.’ 
6 Interestingly, the Sun’s comment piece on August 12th also demonstrated that the actions of rioting and looting did not 
automatically make someone a yob, but actually a presupposed social stereotype that was classified separately from other 
profiles: ‘In court, it was payback time for rioting morons. From yobs to university graduates and even a trainee ballerina, 
they took their turn in the dock’ (page 8). Clearly there is a wider social context and profile that determines this label; 
Johnson’s social background exempts her from ‘yob’ status during her actions.  
7 The Daily Mail’s comment piece, alongside Smith’s column on the same page, is worth noting (and possibly exploring 
beyond the scope of this analysis). Headlined, ‘Bankers looters and politics of envy’, it criticised banks for refusing to 
provide financial help or sympathy to businesses that had been destroyed during the riots: ‘Let's be clear: nothing - nothing - 
could justify or excuse the violent criminality of the looting anarchists who this week so stained Britain's reputation as a 
civilised society. But is it surprising that an increasing number of decent civic-minded people consider the bankers' 
behaviour to be almost as reprehensible? After all, they argue, the bankers have the same contempt for the law-abiding 
public as those looters and the same sense of entitlement to wealth as the teenagers who smash shop windows to steal flat-
screen televisions. More worryingly, the bankers' refusal to rein in their greed is fuelling the politics of envy in Britain and 
envy is a toxic and corrosive creator of social unrest and Left-wing demagoguery’ (2011:14). 
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